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Emerging corporate governance issues in the Asian countries due to the 1997-
1998 economic crises makes it much more important to discuss those issues 
within the context of this region. In developing countries such as Malaysia, a 
good governance of the banks is crucial for the survival of its economy. Many 
studies have tried to link the effect of corporate governance on banks’ efficiency 
(Jain and Thomson, 2008; Chunxia, Shujie and Zongyi, 2009; Lensink, Meesters 
and Naaborg, 2008). This study investigates the impact of corporate governance 
on efficiency of Malaysian listed banks by using a panel data analysis. Corporate 
governance variables are represented by board leadership structure, board 
composition, board size, director ownership, institutional ownership and block 
ownership.  Bank efficiency is used to measure the performance since traditional 
accounting and market performance measures are doubtful in suitability of 
capturing the actual performance of the banking industry and efficiency seems to 
be given more attention recently (e.g. Ihsan and Kabir, 2002). The findings show 
that smaller board size and higher percentage of block ownership lead to better 
efficiency of Malaysian banks. The current prevailing situations in Malaysia are 
discussed to highlight the reasons behind these research findings.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate governance of banks seems to be more important than other industries 
because the banking sector plays a crucial financial intermediary role in any 
economy, particularly in developing countries.  Poor corporate governance of the 
banks can drive the market to lose confidence in the ability of a bank to properly 
manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits, which could in turn trigger a 
liquidity crisis and then it might lead to economic crisis in a country and pose a 
systemic risk to the society at large (Cebenoyan & Strahan, 2001; Basel Committee 
on banking supervision, 2005; Alexander, 2006; Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez, 
2008). Therefore, it is important to examine the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the banking sector. Research on corporate governance have tried to 
examine its impact of the financial performance of business entities (Rebeiz and 
Salameh, 2006; Male and Kusnadi, 2004; Fosberg and Nelson, 1999).   
 
Traditionally, the performance is measured from the accounting and market 
perspectives.  Since banking industry is a service industry, its efficiency is very 
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important factor for competitive positioning and long term sustainability of the bank.  
However, the problem is to the researchers’ knowledge there is no study has been 
done on the impact of corporate governance on bank efficiency in Malaysian context. 
Thus, this study examines the performance of the banks from efficiency perspective 
due to the following reasons.  Firstly, according to Kimball (1998), return on assets 
does not take into consideration the importance of the opportunity cost and return on 
equity ignores the different required rate of returns expected by the shareholders 
since their capital has been invested in different risky projects.  Denizer (1997) states 
that return on equity might not be the best measure since banks can divide the 
capital into debt and equity, making the comparison of equity values across banks 
difficult.  Secondly, nowadays, bank managers, policy makers and bank investors are 
concerned with how the banks efficiently utilize the inputs to produce the financial 
products (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2006). Thirdly, the objective of a 
financial liberalization is to increase the efficiency of commercial banks by creating a 
flexible and competitive financial sector in which banks have more control over their 
own resource utilization, and by increasing the banks’ integration with the rest of the 
world.    In addition, the success of the banks hinges on the ability of the banks to 
identify the types of financial products demanded by the public and provide the 
products efficiently and sell them at a competitive price.  Therefore, cost 
management and the efficient use of the input becomes important to be competitive 
nowadays (United Nations, 2005).  Fourthly, many researchers have investigated the 
efficiency of US and UK banks (United Nations, 2005; Angelidis & Lyroudi, 2006) but 
in Malaysia, the research on examining the efficiency of Malaysian listed banks 
seems to be rather limited.   
 
The importance of bank efficiency has been widely highlighted since the last few 
decades in the academic literature, especially since 1990s (Hamin Syahrum, Syed 
Musa & Naziruddin, 2006).  The bank efficiency is given attention by the 
management since it will be able to trace the sources of inefficiency and it will help 
banks enhance the chance of survival in the competitive markets (Ihsan & M.Kabir, 
2002). Furthermore, it is essential for the overall growth of the economy since any 
lack of growth in efficiency will drag Malaysia’s economy. Historically, although Bank 
Negara Malaysia encourages banks to merge in order to achieve economies of scale 
and higher level of efficiency, Malaysian banking system consists of a large number 
of small institutions (Sufian, 2004).  However, Malaysian banks have gone through 
the major merger process to recover from the 1997-98 economic crisis and to take 
the advantages of economies of scale (Mahadzir & Hasni, 2009; Allen & V. Boobal, 
n.d.). Apart from taking the advantages of economies of scale, Malaysian banks are 
given pressure to be more efficient because of several factors such as significant 
changes in the operating environment and structure due to the rapid growth in 
information technology in the period of 1990 to 2003 (Public Bank Berhad, 2004), 
globalization and liberalization (Izah & Sudin, 2008; Izah, Nor Mazlina & Sudin, 2009) 
and most of the banks are offering Islamic banking products in additional to the 
conventional products (Mohd. Azmi, Abdul Rahim, Rosylin, M. Shabri & Mohd. 
Eskandar, 2006).   
 
It could be summed that the governance seems to be a heart of the corporation, 
especially in the banking sector and looking the bank performance from efficiency 
aspect becomes an attractive issue.  Hence, the aim of this paper is to investigate the 
impact of corporate governance on bank efficiency.   This paper is organized into five 
sections.  Section 2 explains theoretical framework and empirical studies.  Section 3 
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elaborates on the research methodology including development of hypotheses and 
research design.  Section 4 presents the findings and the last section discusses 
findings, limitation of the study and area for future research.   
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The main theoretical assumption of this research relies on the agency framework. 
The following discussions explain about corporate governance and ownership 
structure from the agency framework. 
 
Agency Theory and Separate Leadership Structure 
 
Agency theory argues for a clear separation of the responsibilities of the CEO and 
the chairman of the board and seems to prefer to have separate leadership structure 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993).  The reason is that 
since the day-to-day management of the company is led by the CEO, the chairman of 
the board, as a leader of a board, needs to monitor the decisions made by the CEO 
which will be implemented by the management and to oversee the process of hiring, 
firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO (Brickley et. Al, 1997; Weir, 1997).   If 
the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, there would be no other 
individual to monitor his or her actions and CEO will be very powerful and may 
maximize his or her own interests at the expense of the shareholders.  The combined 
leadership structure promotes CEO entrenchment by reducing board monitoring 
effectiveness (Finkelstein & D’ Aveni, 1994; Florackis & Ozkan, 2004).  Thus, a 
separate leadership structure is recommended in order to monitor the CEO 
objectively and effectively. 
 
Agency Theory and Board Composition 
 
According to Choe and Lee (2003), board composition is very important to effectively 
monitor the managers and reduce the agency cost.  Although the executive directors 
have specialized skills, expertise and valuable knowledge of the firms’ operating 
policies and day-to-day activities, there is a need for the independent directors to 
contribute the fresh ideas, independence, objectivity and expertise gained from their 
own fields (Weir, 1997; Firth et al., 2002).  Hence, the agency theory recommends 
the involvement of independent non-executive directors to monitor any self-interested 
actions by managers and to minimize agency costs (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Le et al. 
2006; Florackis & Ozkan, 2004; Williams et al. 2006). 
 
Agency Theory and Board Size 
 
Jensen (1983) and Florackis and Ozkan (2004) mention that boards with more than 
seven or eight members are unlikely to be effective.  They further elaborate that large 
boards result in less effective coordination, communication, and decision making, and 
are more likely controlled by the CEO.  Yoshikawa and Phan (2003) also highlight 
that larger boards tend to be less cohesive and more difficult to coordinate because 
there might be a large number of potential interactions and conflicts among the group 
members.  In addition, they further state that large boards are often created by CEOs 
because the large board makes the board members disperse the power in the 
boardroom and reduce the potential for coordinated action by directors, leaving the 
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CEO as the predominant figure.  In sum, smaller boards seem to be more conducive 
to board member participation and thus would result in a positive impact on the 
monitoring function and the strategic decision-making capability of the board, and 
independence from the management (Huther, 1997).   
 
Agency Theory and Ownership  
 
Agency theory stresses the importance of ownership structure in enhancing 
corporate governance. It could be viewed from three different perspectives; (a) 
managerial ownership, (b) block ownership, and (c) institutional ownership. If 
directors own shares, the directors as the owners themselves are directly instructing 
and monitoring the management of the companies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Hence, there are likely to be fewer agency problems as compared to the situation 
where the directors, who are not the owners, supervise the management of the 
company.  It is also supported by Seifert et al. (2005) who discuss agency conflicts. 
 
With regard to block ownership, if an individual has a substantial amount of interest in 
a particular company (usually measured at 5%), he or she will be more interested in 
the performance of the company, compared to the shareholders who own a smaller 
number of shares because dispersed ownership may have less incentives to monitor 
management (Kang & Sorensen, 1999; Maher & Andersson, 1999).   Lastly, 
regarding institutional investors, Hussain and Mallin (2002), Kim and Nofsinger 
(2004), Leng (2004), Soloman and Solomon (2004), Seifert et al. (2005), Le et al. 
(2006), Langnan, Steven and Weibin (2007) and Ramzi (2008) collectively agree on 
the important role of institutional shareholders in the monitoring of firms because of 
the following reasons; (a) institutional shareholders normally own substantial number 
of shares, (b) the potential benefits from their activism is large enough to be worth 
their effort, (c) they have less ability than individual shareholders to liquidate the 
shares without affecting the share price, (d) substantial influence on the 
management, (e)  they seem to have a fiduciary responsibility towards the ultimate 
owners, and (f) they have ability to monitor executives since they are professionals. 
 
3. Research Methodology and Model 
 
Hypotheses development 
 
Recent literature on corporate governance has tried to study its impact on the 
financial performance of banks, for example, on banks’ efficiency. Jain and Thomson 
(2008), in a case study of the National Bank of Australia, found that poor governance 
lead to poor financial performance. The following hypotheses will relate corporate 
governance and ownership variables with the financial performance of banks, in term 
of its efficiency.  
 
Board leadership structure 
 
Agency theory and the corporate governance guidelines have emphasized the 
importance of board independence from management through a separate leadership 
structure.  The findings of Fosberg and Nelson (1999), Abdul Rahman and Mohd. 
Haniffa (2005), Chen et al. (2005), Kula (2005), and Rebeiz and Salameh (2006) are 
in line with theoretical expectation, i.e. a positive relationship between separate 
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leadership structure and performance.  Therefore, the first hypothesis (stated in its 
alternative format) is stated as follows: 
 
Ha1: Bank efficiency is positively related to separate leadership structure. 
 
Board composition 
 
The involvement of independent non-executive directors is encouraged by most of 
the codes. The studies conducted by Liang and Li (1999), Prevost et al. (2002),  
Bozec and Dia (2005), Krivogorsky (2006), and  Rebeiz and Salameh (2006) 
highlight the importance of independent directors.  Based on the theoretical 
expectation, this study hypothesized a positive relationship between banks’ efficiency 
and proportion of independent non-executive directors. The hypothesis, stated in its 
alternative form, is as follows: 
  
Ha2: Bank efficiency is positively related to higher proportion of 
independent non-executive directors. 
 
Board size 
 
Several researchers have proposed an optimal board size that might reduce the 
influence of the management on board’s decisions.  For instance, Jensen (1983) (in 
Mak and Li (2001)) proposes a board size of about seven to eight in order to have 
effective monitoring.  In addition, Yoshikawa and Phan (2003) highlight that a CEO 
will purposely create a larger board size to make sure that he or she alone is the 
most powerful person and the board will be difficult to coordinate effectively due to 
the larger size.  Thus, smaller board size seems to be better.  The findings of 
Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Mak and Kusnadi (2004), and Andres et al. 
(2005) support that there is a negative relationship between board size and firm’s 
performance. Based on the theoretical framework and previous literature, the 
hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is as follows:  
  
Ha3: Bank efficiency is negatively related to board size. 
 
Ownership structure 
 
The agency theory stresses on the importance of ownership in enhancing corporate 
governance within a firm, and subsequently leads toward better firm’s performance. 
For example, through ownership, managers’ interests could be aligned with the 
shareholders’ interest as managers have now become part of the owners. With 
regard to relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance, 
Sanders (1999), Fuerst and Kang (2004), and Shen et al. (2006) show that there is a 
positive relationship between director ownership and performance.    
 
Regarding block ownership, the discussion of agency theory has mentioned that a 
substantial amount of ownership interest make the owner more interested in 
monitoring the management for the better performance of the company, compared to 
a person who has less ownership interest (Kang & Sorensen, 1999). Lehmann and 
Weigand (2000), Xu and Wang (1999), Hamadi (2002), Mitton (2000), and 
Krivogorsky (2006) find that there is a positive relationship between block ownership 
and performance.   
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Based on the agency theory, it could be derived that since the institutional owners 
have a higher percentage of ownership interest in the firms, they might be more 
concerned with the performance of the firms, compared with individual shareholders.  
Hence, in theory, it is expected that higher percentage of institutional ownership will 
lead to better performance of the firms. The findings of Xu and Wang (1999), Dwivedi 
and Jain (2003), Patibandla (2006), Leng (2004), Shen et al. (2006), Krivogorsky 
(2006), and Cornett et al. (2007) are in line with theoretical expectation.  This means 
that higher institutional ownership will lead to better performance.  Based on the 
agency theory, the following hypothesis on the relationship between ownership and 
firm’s performance has been developed. 
 
Ha4: Bank efficiency is positively related to higher proportion of director 
ownership, higher proportion of block ownership and higher proportion 
of institutional ownership. 
 
Empirical Model and Sample selection 
 
In this section, the empirical model of the study will be presented. The dependent 
variable is the efficiency of the banks, which are measured using two proxies; the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL_TL) and the ratio of operating 
expenses to total assets (OPEXP_TA). There are six independent variables which 
comprise of three conventional measures of corporate governance (i.e. board 
leadership structure, board composition and board size) and three measures of 
ownership structure (i.e. director ownership, institutional ownership, and block 
ownership). Finally, the empirical model of the study also includes four control 
variables; two control variables related to firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm size 
and leverage), and two control variables related to economic environment (i.e. gross 
domestic product rate and economic crisis). The complete empirical model is as 
follows:  
 
EFFICIENCY =  βo + β1 BLS+β2 INE_BZ + β3 BZ +β4 DOWN+β5 IOWN+  
β6 BOWN+ β7 LNTA+ β8 TD_TE+ β9 GDP RATEx9i +  
β10 DUM_CRISIS + εit  
Where,  
EFFICIENCY = Performance is measured using two proxies; namely, ratio of non-  
     performing loans to total loans and ratio of operating expenses to 
    total assets 
BLS          = Board leadership structure where 1 = separate leadership structure,    
and 0 = combined leadership structure 
INE_BZ = Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board 
BZ  = Board size 
DOWN = Proportion of director ownership 
IOWN  = Proportion of institutional ownership 
BOWN = Proportion of block ownership  
LNTA   = Firm size, measured by Log of total assets  
TD_TE = Leverage, measured by total assets over total equity 
GDP RATE = Gross domestic product growth rate 
DUM_CRISIS = Dummy variable for economic crisis years, where 1 = crisis year,  
   and  0 = non-crisis year 
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Sample includes the twelve listed banking companies since there are only twelve 
listed banks in Malaysia.  Sample data have been collected from 1996 until 2005 
because Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) was introduced in year 
2001 and data collected period is five years before and after introducing MCCG 
(2001).  The total number of observations is 120 observations. However, some of the 
observations need to be dropped due to unavailability of data and some companies 
were not classified as banks in all the ten years’ period. It left the final observations to 
108 observations. Data were collected either from the annual reports of the 
companies or from Bloomberg. The statistical method used in this study is panel data 
analysis (generalized least square method).  Generalized least square method is 
used because the sample data are not normally distributed and the data have either 
heteroskedasticity problem, autocorrelation problem or both. According to Gujarati 
(2003), using generalized least square method will overcome all these problems.  
 
4. Findings   
 
Under this section, the descriptive statistics will be explained first.  It will be followed 
by the discussions on the GLS multivariate regression results on the relationship 
between bank efficiency and corporate governance variables. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study.  In case of 
board leadership structure, its mean value (0.81) shows that a majority of the 
companies have separate leadership structure although the minimum value (zero) 
shows that there are companies which have combined leadership structure.  Similar 
to the recommendation of the MCCG (2001), the sample mean value (0.36) shows 
that ratio of independent directors is slightly more than one third of the total number 
of the directors.  The mean value (8.23) of board size shows existence of quite a 
reasonable board size, e.g. Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that a board size of 
not more than 7 or 8 members is considered reasonable in ensuring effectiveness. 
For ownership, the mean values of director ownership and institutional ownership are 
0.02 and 0.17 respectively.  The ownership of shares by directors can be considered 
very low where, on average, only 2 percent of shares owned by the directors. On the 
other hand, institutional investors, on average, owned 17 percent of shares which 
could still be considered low although it is significantly higher than the ownership by 
the directors.  In the case of block ownership, its mean value (0.53) shows that the 
significant portion of the shares is owned by large shareholders.   
 
The means values of dependent variables are: for ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans (11.19) and ratio of operating expenses to total assets (0.02).  As for the 
firm-specific characteristics, the sample companies have the means values of 
RM45992.19 millions for total assets and 344.73 for the ratio of total debt to total 
equity. Finally, the average GDP rate is 8 percent per annum.  
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Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics Results  
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median 
(a) CG variables         
BLS 0.81 0.40 0.00 1.00 
INE_BZ 0.36 0.18 0.10 0.33 
BZ 8.23 2.34 4.00 8.00 
(b) Ownership variables     
DOWN 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 
IOWN 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.09 
BOWN 0.53 0.21 0.00 0.58 
(c) Efficiency variables     
NPL_TL 11.19 12.09 0.00 9.18 
OPEXP_TA 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 
(d) Control variables     
TA 45992.19 40245.92 1120.36 33326.95 
TD_TE 344.73 331.14 14.03 223.80 
GDP RATE 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.09 
 
GLS Results 
 
Efficiency is measured by two proxies, namely, ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans and ratio of operating expenses to total assets.  The findings for each will be 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
Ratio of Non-performing Loans to Total Loans as a Proxy of Efficiency 
 
Table 2 shows the GLS results for the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (i.e. 
NPL_TL).  With regard to the corporate governance variables, only board size has a 
significant effect on banks’ efficiency (at p<0.01). The higher the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans, the lower will be banks’ efficiency. Therefore, a 
significant positive relationship between board size and ratio of non-performing loans 
to total loans means that a smaller board size influence better banks’ efficiency. As 
for the ownership variables, higher ownership by the directors (i.e. DOWN) and more 
concentrated ownership (i.e. BOWN) lead to better banks’ efficiency. The results 
could suggest that as directors own more shares of the company, the interests of 
shareholders are better aligned to the firms’ interests. The significance of 
concentrated ownership could suggest better monitoring by the blockholders. Finally, 
with regard to the control variables, bigger banks, better economic environment and 
financial crisis period lead to better banks’ efficiency. 
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Table 2: 
GLS results of ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans 
 Coefficient 
Z 
Statistics P value  
Independent variables     
BLS 0.17 0.12 0.90  
INE_BZ 5.16 1.25 0.21  
BZ 0.81 2.6* 0.01  
DOWN -39.89 -4.13* 0.00  
IOWN -5.05 -1.62 0.11  
BOWN -7.23 -2.41** 0.02  
Control variables     
LNTA -2.16 -2.41** 0.02  
TD_TE 0.00 -0.19 0.85  
GDP RATE -32.09 -4.6* 0.00  
DUM_CRISIS -2.96 -2.6* 0.01  
CONS 32.24 4.33* 0.00  
Chi2   71.17*  
P value   0  
Heteroskedastic LR Chi2   158.31*  
(LR Test) P value   0  
Autocorrelation F statistics   2361.29*  
(Wooldridge Test) P value   0  
* Significant at 1%    
** Significant at 5%    
 
 
Ratio of Operating Expenses to Total Assets as a Proxy of Efficiency 
 
Table 3 shows the GLS results for the ratio operating expenses to total assets (i.e. 
OPEXP_TA) which is the second proxy for efficiency.  Overall, the GLS results of the 
second proxy of efficiency (i.e. OPEXP_TA) are much weaker as the Chi2 value is 
much lower (i.e. 29.58) than the GLS results of NPL_TL (Chi2 of 71.17). Consistent 
with the results in Table 2, board size is still found to be significant (at p<0.10). 
Institutional ownership (i.e. IOWN) is also found to be significant; however, the sign of 
relationship contradicts theoretical expectation. As for the control variables, only firm 
size is found to be significant. 
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Table 3: 
GLS results of ratio of operating expenses to total 
assets 
 Coefficient Z Statistics P value 
Independent variables    
BLS 0.00 0.02 0.99 
INE_BZ 0.00 0.17 0.86 
BZ 0.00 1.66 0.10 
DOWN 0.00 0.09 0.93 
IOWN 0.01 3.41* 0.00 
BOWN 0.00 -1.45 0.15 
Control variables    
LNTA 0.00 -2.50* 0.01 
TD_TE 0.00 -0.16 0.87 
GDP RATE 0.00 -0.45 0.65 
DUM_CRISIS 0.00 0.59 0.56 
CONS 0.03 5.35* 0.00 
Chi2   29.58* 
P value   0.00 
Heteroskedastic LR Chi2   80.30* 
(LR Test) P value   0 
Autocorrelation F statistics   25.41* 
(Wooldridge Test) P value   0.00 
* Significant at 1%   
** Significant at 5%   
 
 
Based on the GLS results of the two proxies of banks’ efficiency, many conventional 
corporate governance and ownership structure variables, based on the agency 
framework, were found to be insignificant. Although agency theory represents an 
attractive platform for structuring corporate governance systems, generalizability of 
such theory is seems rather restrictive. This theory seems to be Anglo-American 
centric, grounded in capitalistic theory (Mccarthy & Puffer, 2008) and insensitive to 
non-economic forces that drive managerial choices in mixed (socialist/ capitalist) 
economies.  Hence, it could be concluded that corporate governance systems are not 
converging and (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2003) so local laws and local business 
environment might influence the governance system in its own country (Seifert et al., 
2005). Furthermore, the agency theory focuses on the conflict between directors and 
owners but not between the majority and minority shareholders.  In Malaysia, the 
later conflict is the major problem and hence the applicability of agency theory in 
Malaysian context is rather limited. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions   
 
The findings of this study have important implication for banks in Malaysia since it is 
found that among the corporate governance variables, smaller board size and higher 
ratio of block ownership consistently seem to have better efficiency.  However, the 
rest of the corporate governance variables do not seem to have significant and 
consistent impact on efficiency.  There are few factors which could explain weak 
system of corporate governance in Malaysia. For example, Liew (2006) suggests that 
in order to implement the corporate governance system effectively in Malaysia, it is 
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necessary to have the policies that strictly limit or eliminate the power and influence 
of bureaucrats and dominant owner-managers or top management in businesses as 
well as the policies that ensure the independence of regulators.  Malaysian culture 
also influences the effectiveness of corporate governance system. Mohammad Rizal 
(2006), in his study of corporate governance policies in Malaysia, suggests that there 
is no real market for takeovers and a negligible risk of being sued by shareholders to 
discipline directors and senior managers. The effectiveness of independent director 
provisions would be severely compromised in an environment where companies are 
run by autocratic leaders and in a culture where confrontations are generally avoided.  
Hence, a Western-style board may not work well within a Malaysian culture. 
   
One limitation of this paper is concerned with the financial crisis periods.  Since the 
sample period of study includes the financial crisis periods, i.e. 1997 and 1998, the 
dummy variables are used to control the crisis period.  However, the effects of the 
financial crisis might still exist after 1998. Another limitation is regarding the 
unavailability of the data.  Inclusion of foreign and local unlisted banks would be more 
desirable.  However, due to the unavailability of the data, foreign and locally unlisted 
banks are not included in the sample of study.  Since this study focuses on the end 
products of the corporate governance, i.e. efficiency performance, hence, future 
research should extend to the examination of the process of the corporate 
governance decision and the environmental factors that make current corporate 
governance systems and laws less effective. 
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